University of Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy
Volume 1

Issue 1

Article 8

1987

Impact Fees, Housing Costs, and Housing Affordability
Charles J. Delaney

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/jlpp

Recommended Citation
Delaney, Charles J. (1987) "Impact Fees, Housing Costs, and Housing Affordability," University of Florida
Journal of Law & Public Policy: Vol. 1: Iss. 1, Article 8.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/jlpp/vol1/iss1/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in University of Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

IMPACT FEES, HOUSING COSTS, AND
HOUSING AFFORDABILITY:
WHO BEARS THE IMPACT OF IMPACT FEES?
Charles J. Delaney*
I.
II.
III.

INTRODUCTION

..........................

OVERVIEW OF IMPACT FEE STUDIES ............
IMPACT FEE INCIDENCE: WHO BEARS THE COST?

A. Market Analysis .........................
B. Builder Response .........................
C. Marginal Households and the Effect of Impact
Fees ..........
.......................
1. Orlando & Miami .......................
D. Long Run Supply Response .................
E. Extensions of the Analysis ..................
IV.

CONCLUSIONS

...........................
I.

87

89
92
92
93
94
96
98
99
101

INTRODUCTION

Florida local governments are increasingly using impact fees to
pay for the capital improvements resulting from rapid development.
Two recent surveys reported that at least twenty-six counties and
sixty-two cities in Florida were using impact fees to pay for sewers,
water mains, park facilities, fire and police protection, roads, and
other public services., In addition, thirteen cities and seventeen counties either have or are considering impact fee ordinances.2 In some
instances, cities have already had to increase impact 3fees to keep pace
with the growing demand for capital improvements.

*B.A., 1974, University of Rhode Island; M.A. 1981, Ph.D., 1987, University of Florida.
Professor Delaney is currently a community and economic development specialist with the
Institute of Food and Agricultural Sciences and teaches undergraduate real estate analysis at
the University of Florida.
1. Manion, Use of Impact Fees Runs Into Some Limitations, The Tampa Tribune, January
25, 1988, at B-I, col. 5 (26 counties and at least 36 cities use impact fees). E. MILLER & E.
LINES, PAYING FOR FLORIDA'S GROWTH: SURVEY SHOWS USE OF IMPACT FEES 1 (Economic
Leaflets, Vol. 45, No. 4. University of Florida, Bureau of Economic and Business Research)
(1986) (15 counties and 62 cities use impact fees).
2. E. MILLER & E. LINES, supra note 1, at 1.
3. See, e.g., Manion, supra note 1, at 5-B. Tampa's proposed rate hike would increase
impact fees from $1.10 per square foot to $3.63 per square foot, a 330% increase. Id.
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Impact fees are cash assessments builders must pay, usually at
the time a building permit is issued, to finance offsite capital improvements such as roads, sewers, parks, or schools. 4 These capital improvements are necessitated by new housing construction. In this sense,
impact fees are an attempt to charge those who benefit from new
capital improvements a proportionate amount of the overall cost of
providing such services. 5 However, local governments also may use
impact fees as a method of land use control or growth management.
For example, a county may institute impact fees to restrict growth
or to direct development away from the urban fringe and towards
vacant parcels in previously developed areas. 6 With about 300,000
persons moving to Florida annually, 7 a reasonable assumption is that
local governments' impact fee usage will continue to grow to finance
the demand for capital improvements and public services.
At the same time that impact fees are being adopted as a means
to address the state's infrastructure needs, concern is being expressed
about the affordability of housing for certain population groups in
Florida. This concern has led the Florida Legislature to study housing
affordability issues. Several studies have concluded that state and
local government regulations and requirements, such as impact fees,
increase housing costs significantly. s This paper addresses the theoretical relationship between impact fees and housing affordability for
moderate and middle income groups. The paper begins with an overview of the results of various impact fee studies. Included in this
section are discussions of the short and long term effects of impact
fees and who bears the incidence of impact fees. The paper then

4. See generally Juergensmeyer & Blake, Impact Fees: An Answer to Local Governments'
CapitalFunding Dilemma, 9 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 415 (1981) (overview of impact fee usage).
5. Impact fees only cover a percentage of the total amount of providing particular services.
For example, in Hillsborough County transportation impact fees cover about 27.5% of total cost
while in neighboring Pasco County the fees cover 50%. See Manion, supra note 1, at 5-B. A
proposed increase in a Tampa impact fee is expected to cover 45% of costs of capital improvements
due to new growth. Id. The revenue shortfalls are covered by gasoline taxes and other city
revenues. Id.
6. Landis, Land Regulation and the Price of New Housing: Lessons from Three California
Cities, 52 J. AM. PLAN. A. 9, 12 (1986).
7. This represents a 15.7% increase from 1980-1985. G. Israel & L. Beaulieu, Populations
and Farms in Florida: Trends & Characteristics, 3 (unpublished manuscript, Center for Rural
Development, University of Florida, Gainesville).
8. D. DOWALL, THE SUBURBAN SQUEEZE: LAND CONVERSION AND REGULATION IN
THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA 134 (1984). S. SEIDEL, HOUSING COSTS AND GOVERNMENT
REGULATIONS: CONFRONTING THE REGULATORY MAZE 228 (1978). See Manion, supra note
1, at 5-B (a current Tampa proposal would increase impact fees in two middle class neighborhoods
from $656 to $2077 for a 1500 square foot home).
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presents a model that demonstrates the effects of impact fees on
housing costs using data from two Florida cities. The paper concludes
that market supply and demand for housing determine which parties
builders, buyers or landowners - bear the burden of the impact
fee. This result has implications for a number of public policy considerations including housing affordability and the redistributional effects
of impact fees on wealth and income.
II.

OVERVIEW OF IMPACT FEE STUDIES

The implementation of land use controls can have considerable
impact on the operation of local housing markets. One commentator
stated that "the degree or magnitude of impact depends on the demand
for land and housing and on the way that local policy affects the supply
of residential land and housing." 9 Without supply and demand information, land use controls and growth management policies are developed
and implemented without full comprehension of their remifications on
housing markets and, in particular, housing affordability. This section
presents an overview of housing market analysis with emphasis on
determining the incidence of impact fees.
A number of recent studies have attempted to determine the likely
effects of impact fees on new home prices. The key issue in these
studies is whether impact fees are borne by the homebuilder, passed
back to landowners, or passed forward to home purchasers. Generally,
the studies take one of two approaches. Some use a strictly theoretical
economic approach; others take an empirical approach. However, empirical work in this area is limited by data problems derived in part
from the recent adoption of impact fees. This paper uses both approaches by applying empirical data to a simplified economic model.
First, an overview of the results of existing theoretical work is presented.
Any attempt to estimate the effects of impact fees necessitates an
understanding of the interaction of the supply and demand for housing.
Elasticities, the sensitivities of market demand and supply to price
changes, are critical. 1° One study considers these supply and demand

9. Dowall, Reducing the Cost Effects of Local Land Use Controls, 47 J. AM. PLAN. A.,
145, 146 (1981).

10. Elasticities measure buyers' and sellers' degree of responsiveness to market price
changes. Mathematically, they are equal to the absolute value of the percentage change in the
quantity of housing demanded (supplied) divided by the percentage change in the price of
housing. See generally L. KENNY & R. BLAIR, MICROECONOMICS FOR MANAGERIAL DECISION-MAKING 43-47 (1982). For example, if housing prices increases 10%, and buyers continue
to purchase the same number of houses, housing demand is termed "inelastic" (i.e. buyers are
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elasticities in four sub-market types." The study concludes that the
incidence of impact fees will depend on the nature of supply and
demand in the sub-market in question. In particular, the party with
the lowest sensitivity to changes in market prices will bear the burden
of the fee. For example, in housing sub-markets where the housing
sellers and buyers are equally sensitive to price changes, then the
buyer and seller (assumed to be the builder) will share the cost of
impact fees assessed against the structure. In a situation where demand is relatively inelastic 12 and supply is highly elastic,1s the buyer
can expect to assume most, if not all, of the cost of the impact fees
in the form of a higher sale price. Conversely, the builder can be
expected to bear most of the cost of infrastructure charges when
demand is relatively elastic and supply is relatively inelastic. These
results are consistent with economic theory which suggest this general
rule: the party who is least sensitive to price changes shoulders a
relatively greater burden of an impact tax.14
Another study also considered different market types in its discussion of impact fees.15 This study noted that the higher costs resulting
from impact fees would fall totally on the buyer only in those communities considered more attractive than others in nearby locations.
In markets where demand is relatively inelastic, sellers of housing
accrue a degree of monopoly or market power. 16 Homebuyers in these
markets must pay a premium, all or almost all the impact fee, to live
in the community.
insensitive to price changes where demand elasticity equals 0). However, if 20% fewer houses
were purchased, demand is relatively more "elastic" (demand elasticity equals 2). This latter
result means buyers are relatively more sensitive to price changes than in the former instance.
Similarly, housing sellers are also sensitive to market prices. If housing market prices increase
10% but sellers do not produce more housing units, supply is termed 'inelastic" (supply elasticity
equals 0); if sellers produce 20% more housing units, supply is relatively more "elastic" (supply
elasticity equals 2).
11. Weitz, Who Pays Infrastructure Benefit Charges: The Builder or the Home Buyer?,
in THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCE 94 (J. Nicholas 1985). The
four sub-market types include (1) inelastic demand/elastic supply; (2) inelastic demand/elastic
supply; (3) elastic demand/elastic supply; and (4) elastic demand/inelastic supply.
12. The quantity of housing demanded does not decline much when the price of a given
quantity of housing increases.
13. Builders are willing to supply a greater quantity of housing at higher prices.
14. See A. ATKINSON & J. STIGLITZ, LECTURES ON PUBLIC ECONOMICS 160-72 (1980).
15. Stegman, Development Fees for Infrastructure, 45 URB. LAND, May 1986, at 2.
16. Market power, also termed monopoly power, is the power of a firm to raise the price
of its product by restricting output. R. BLAIR & D. KASERMAN, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS
110-17 (1985). "In all markets that are not perfectly competitive, each firm has some degree of
market power - each can increase its price to some extent without a total loss of sales." Id.
at 110. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966).
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A third study argues that in the long run, when there exists a
competitive market for development sites, the incidence of impact fees
most probably will fall in whole, or at least primarily, on landowners
who sell their land to developers. 17 Since a builder estimates the
amount of fees required prior to construction and incorporates the
amount into a lower bid price for the desired parcel, the pre-development landowner is more likely to pay a higher percentage of any
impact fees. If the market for developable land follows this pattern,
then impact fees will not affect housing affordability over time. One
commentator reached a similar conclusion and noted that developers:
When bidding for land in a city with [high development fees]
developers would bid less, because they would take into
account the fee they would later have to pay when they
built. The burden would thus be passed backward to the
people who, at the time the fee became fully anticipated,
owned land suitable for residential development."'
Another study examined a number of land use controls used to
regulate residential development and found that such controls had
both direct and indirect effects on housing costs.' 9 Impact fees have
a direct price effect by shifting infrastructure costs from the public
to the providers of new housing. Housing costs are affected indirectly
when impact fee charges cause the number of builders in a particular
market to decline. The declining number of builders reduces competition and grants the remaining builders a degree of market power.This market power allows builders to charge excess prices for their
product.21 Impact fees also indirectly affect housing prices when developers reorient their operations to serve a higher income clientele.
The marketability of high volume, low- to moderately-priced homes
declines when builders have to raise prices to offset higher costs.
Therefore, builders will shift to more expensive housing construction
where profit potential is greater. Consequently, the supply of lower
priced, more "affordable" homes will be reduced as their prices rise.

17. P. Downing & T. McCaleb, The Economics of Exactions, in DEVELOPMENT EXACTIONS
(J. Frank & R. Rhodes eds. forthcoming 1988).
18. R. EUickson, The Irony of InclusionaryZoning, in RESOLVING THE HOUSING CRISIS
154 (M. Johnson ed. 1982).
19. D. DOWALL, THE SUBURBAN SQUEEZE: LAND CONVERSION AND REGULATION IN
THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA 108 (1984).
20. See R. BLAIR & D. KASERMAN, supra note 16, at 110.
21. Id.
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The effect of land use controls, including impact fees, was found
to be greatest in situations where such controls limit the entry of
outside builders to a particular market.- This study observed in three
California cities that when regulations cause a reduced supply of developable land, a small group of builders is likely to dominate the
market. Market power is present that allows builders to exercise more
control over price than they would have in a competitive market. The
study also found "that in growing markets the most important price
effects of local land use controls are indirect, and that the structure
of the local homebuilding industry influences how local regulations
increase new home prices. '" 2
In summary, the empirical and theoretical literature indicates that
the burden of impact fees may be borne by the builder, the homebuyer,
the landowner, or some combination of the three. Furthermore, this
literature has focused primarily on the first level effect of impact fees
(i.e. the effect on the sale price of new homes in the community
imposing impact fees). Fewer efforts have been made to trace the
effects of impact fees on the price of new homes in a community
located nearby but unencumbered by impact fees, or on existing homes
that are in competition with new dwellings. This paper will address
the effects of impact fees as suggested by economic theory, thereby
illustrating the potential relationship of impact fees to housing affordability in Florida.
III.

IMPACT FEE INCIDENCE: WHO BEARS THE COST?

A.

Market Analysis

The analysis in this section uses a model which includes some
simplifying assumptions regarding the structure of the housing market
in which impact fees are used. First, there is a community (F) which
has impact fees and is located geographically near other communities
(NFs) which do not have impact fees. In the absence of impact fees,
prospective homebuyers consider the NFs equally attractive to F.
These communities (F and NFs) comprise one housing market. For
simplification, two identical communities, F and NF, are considered.
The amenities and public services offered in each are the same and
locational and linkage, or transportation, factors result in the home-

22. Landis, Land Regulation and the Price of New Housing: Lessons from Three California
Cities, 52 J. AM. PLAN. A. 9 (1986).
23.

Id. at 10.
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buyer being indifferent to residing in either of the two communities.
The sole criteria for electing to live in F or NF is the price of comparable housing. Also assumed, as is likely in Florida's growth areas, is
that, in the long run, demand for housing is inelastic across the entire
market while the long run supply of housing is elastic. However,
demand for housing within communities may be very elastic because
of the presence of comparable but lower priced housing in neighboring
communities.
This model assumes that a rational person will choose to pay less
as opposed to more for an identical bundle of housing services and
prefers new housing over equivalently priced existing housing. Therefore, if community F imposes an impact fee and the builder attempts
to pass it through to homebuyers, a prospective buyer will choose a
comparable home in community NF. Several additional assumptions
are also necessary.2 The subsequent effects of this action are illustrated in the context of a two community world.
B.

Builder Response

The immediate consequence of a fee levied in community F will
be to raise the builder's cost of constructing a home. If the builder in
community F were unable to pass the impact fee through to homebuyers, then he must either reduce profits, lower other factor costs
such as labor, or reduce the price paid for land suitable for development. Because the model assumes the builders' market is competitive,
profits cannot be lowered in response to increased costs. In addition,
due to collective bargaining agreements, inadequate labor supply, or
strong builder demand for other factors of production, it may not be
possible to reduce factor costs. Prices for developable land depend on

24. These assumptions are necessary to have intelligible results; the assumptions can be
altered to determine the effects of impact fees in communities which do not have the assumed
characteristics.
1. F and NF operate as a single market for labor and building supplies, and
the supply of these factors is constant across F and NF. The mix of each factor
can vary but cannot exceed the amount available initially.
2. Land suitable for development is limited in both communities.
3. Impact fees are levied against all new housing construction (single- and
multi-family) in community F and collected from the builder at the time the building
permit is issued. There are no impact fees in community NF.
4. Impact fees are significant and total at least $2,500 per single-family housing
unit.
5. Builders face no barriers to entry in either community.
6. A number of competing firms operate in the housing market.

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. I

alternative uses for the land, the extent to which builders have already
inventoried land, and the willingness of landowners to sell at lower
prices. Thus, the builder may have to raise prices. The result of the
price increase is that demand for new homes in community F will
decline and demand for new homes in NF will increase.
In the short run housing supply is inelastic (builders cannot immediately increase the supply of new homes), the increased demand
in NF will manifest itself fully in the form of higher prices. As builders
respond to the increased demand, prices for homes in community NF
would be expected to rise to, but not be greater than, home prices
in F including impact fees. These higher prices reflect both limited
land availability and demand in excess of available supply.
These higher prices for new homes will have an effect on marginal
homebuyers, those who were just able to afford a new home prior to
impact fees. Because of the increase in home prices these marginal
buyers now find they cannot afford new housing in either market.
Realizing that new housing has become unaffordable, marginal buyers
will attempt to either purchase existing housing which has features
similar to that of new housing or remain in their current homes. The
shift in demand from new to existing housing will force the price of
existing housing upwards. Potential first time homebuyers at the margin will either seek rental housing if they are new to the community
or remain in rental housing if they already reside in the community.
The increased demand for rental housing will, of course, result in
increased rents in both communities, further exacerbating the affordability problem.
Impact fees levied on housing in community F will, therefore,
indirectly raise prices for new and existing housing and raise rents
on other housing units. The impact will be felt in both communities,
albeit at different times. Builders will experience windfall gains if land
prices in NF do not increase. Sellers of existing homes in either community will also experience gains.2
C.

Marginal Households and the Effect of Impact Fees

Using common rule-of-thumb measures, the magnitude of the effects of impact fees on housing prices can be estimated. Assume that
a new home would sell for $75,000,26 and that a $15,000 down payment

25. A real estate transfer tax or some similar revenue raising mechanism is a way to
capture growth-induced, market value increases across the entire market. Impact fees, of course,
only capture increases from new housing.
26. This figure might represent a lower bound for new home prices.
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is available. A $60,000 mortgage loan is necessary. The monthly
mortgage payments for such a loan are calculated at three interest
rates: ten, twelve, and fifteen percent (See Table 1). Using $150 per
month as the cost of property taxes and insurance, the total monthly
housing expenditure is obtained. Assuming that the total monthly
housing expenditure cannot be more than thirty percent of income,
the annual income necessary to purchase the home is calculated and
ranges from about $27,000 to over $36,000 depending on the interest
rate.
The same calculations are then made assuming that an impact fee
of $3,000 is imposed and is passed through by builders to homebuyers.
The impact fee increases price and mortgage loan amounts to $78,000
and $63,000, respectively. The income necessary to afford a house
increases in a range of $1,000 to over $1,500 depending on the interest
rate.- Similar price and income implications would result as the indirect effects of impact fees raise prices for new and existing housing
throughout the market. As a result, a significant number of households
are forced out of the market.
TABLE 1
Median Priced Housing
10% Interest Rate

No Fee

With Fee

Monthly mortgage payments

$526.56

$552.89

Total monthly housing expenses

676.56

702.89

Annual income required at 30%

27,040

28,116

12% Interest Rate

No Fee

With Fee

Monthly mortgage payments

$617.16

$648.00

Total monthly housing expenses

767.16

798.00

Annual income required at 30%

30,686

31,920

15% Interest Rate

No Fee

With Fee

Monthly mortgage payments

$758.64

$796.57

Total monthly housing expenses

908.64

996.57

Annual income required at 30%

36,345

37,863

27.

See Table 1, col. 3 (Difference).

Difference

$1076

$1234

$1518
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1. Orlando & Miami
An analysis of Annual Housing Survey data on households in Orlando and Miami allows further investigation into the effects of impact
fees on marginal households. These are the only Florida cities covered
in this quadrennial survey of sixty metropolitan areas. A common
rule-of-thumb is that a household can purchase a house with a value
of two and one-half times annual income. Table 2 shows that using
this standard in Orlando in 1981, twenty-seven percent of all recent
movers who chose home ownership paid more than that standard,
with the bulk of these households lying below the $27,700 median
TABLE 2
Recent Mover Households

AIi

Income

Orlando, 1981

(1)

(2)

(3)

<$3,000

200

100%

3,000- 6,999

300

7,000- 9,999

Miami, 1983
(4)

(5)
100%

100

400
200

300

100

400

50

10,000-14,999

1,200

60

600

35

15,000-19,999

1,100

35

2,300

65

20,000-24,999

1,300

40

1,400

60

25,000-34,999

2,100

40

3,200

60

35,000-49,999

1,300

15

2,200

50,000-74,999

1,400

-

1,000

20

500

-

1,800

-

75,000 or >
Total

9,700

27

13,400

Median Income

$27,000

$28,700

Median House Price

$60,100

$65,900

-

-

35

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Annual Housing Survey, pp.
D6-D8 (1981) pp. D6-D8 (1983).
Note: Columns (2) and (4) are the estimated number of housing unit
purchases in each city. Columns (3) and (5) are the estimated percentage of households buying housing with a purchase price more than
2.5 times annual income.
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income level. Similarly in Miami in 1983, thirty-five percent of recent
mover households paid more than the standard, with most again below
the median income level. A $3,000 increase in house prices would
cause even more households to fall below that level of affordability.
Table 3 gives the percentages for all homeowners with mortgages
in the two markets paying more than twenty percent of income as
housing costs. It is apparent that in both markets a large percentage
of households with below median income were paying over this affordability standard. Clearly there are a number of households struggling
to meet housing costs as measured by common rule-of-thumb measures. The imposition of an impact fee in a market as described above,
in which the fee would ultimately impact on buyers, would exacerbate
these affordability problems.TABLE 3
Monthly Housing Costs Greater Than 25% of Income.
(All owner households with a mortgage).
Income

Orlando, 1981

Miami, 1983

100%

100%

3,000- 6,999

100

100

7,000- 9,999

85

95

10,000-14,999

65

75

15,000-19,999

45

60

20,000-24,999

25

55

25,000-34,999

20

30

35,00049,999

10

10

50,000-74,999

10

10

5

5

<$3,000

75,000 or >
Median Income =

$25,900

$31,300

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Annual Housing Survey, pp.
D6-D8 (1981) pp. D6-D8 (1983).
28. A 1985 study conducted an in depth, county-by-county analysis of housing costs assuming
impact fees were passed through to homebuyers. The study estimated the price of new and
existing houses and compared it to median income. The authors found that impact fees would
affect affordability for a number of households. J. De Lisle, & A. Tashchian, Impact of Florida's
Growth Management on the Affordability of Housing, STAR Grant administered by Florida
Institute of Government (October 1986).
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In this two community scenario, the most likely short run effect
of the impact fee will be to raise the price of new and existing housing.
Rental prices also will rise but lag somewhat behind the rise in housing
prices. The marginal household will be the household most adversely
affected because they will no longer be able to afford to purchase
housing. The affordability of any housing in the market will be reduced
dollar-for-dollar by the amount of the impact fee passed forward
through higher price.
D.

Long Run Supply Response

The long run responses of builders in community F to the impact
fee effects described above include a number of options. Depending
on the profits anticipated, builders can: 1) exit the construction industry in community F as single-family construction in the moderate to
middle income range becomes less profitable with the higher level of
costs and build in community NF; 2) switch from single-family in
community F to multi-family housing construction in community NF
where excess demand exists because of marginal buyers priced out of
the owner-occupied housing market; 3) switch to non-housing construction; or 4) build higher price housing where the extra cost of impact
fees are less of a burden to potential buyers, but where the number
of potential buyers may be limited.
Operating under the assumption of a competitive market, the supply of new, single-family housing in the two communities will eventually decline due to increased prices caused by impact fees in community
F and greater demand in community NF. Theoretically, supply will
decline to the point where new housing supplied is just equal to housing
demanded. At this point the supply of housing provided will have
dropped by an amount just sufficient to meet demand at the higher
price.
In community F, the reduction in the demand for land will result
in lower bid prices and, consequently, certain parcels will be withdrawn from the land market. The effect of this action and reaction is
indeterminate. If supply is reduced just enough to accommodate remaining demand then prices realized for land will remain constant. If
reduced supply exceeds (lags) demand, land prices will fall (rise) relative to former prices. Thus, the price of a new home may rise, decline,
or remain constant depending on the magnitude of the supply response.
To the extent impact fees are capitalized into lower bid prices for
developable land, housing prices will drop below the short run increase
in price.
If the housing market operates as described, the rise in prices and
rents predicted above will not be a temporary phenomenon. As the
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price of housing reaches this new equilibrium, marginal buyers will
continue to be priced out of the owner-occupied market and be less
able to afford new housing than prior to impact fee impositions.
E.

Extensions of the Analysis

The analysis in this paper has been conducted under a set of
simplifying assumptions. Obviously, different communities have different housing supply and demand characteristics as well as differing
relationships to the inter-community housing market. It is important
for a community to determine its own situation before considering the
likely effects of impact fees. This section, therefore, offers some alternative market scenarios, such as non-homogeneous communities, and
briefly discusses how housing supply and demand, and resulting prices,
might be affected in these situations.
One situation that can occur is the case in which the communities
are no longer considered equally acceptable to potential homebuyers. 29
In this situation, demand for housing is inelastic among communities
as well as throughout the market. It is possible that instead of opting
out of new housing altogether, potential buyers will reevaluate their
wants, needs, and financial status and simply pay the increased cost
of housing. Alternatively, they may elect to purchase a smaller quantity of new housing (i.e. a home with less square footage or fewer
amenities, in order to reside in the desired community). In the latter
case, the effect of impact fees in community F may be to shift demand
for housing downward to the lower quality ranges (now selling for a
higher price) leaving demand for existing and rental housing unchanged. If builders are responsive to this change in demand, a greater
quantity of smaller housing will be provided leaving relative affordability unchanged.30
This paper previously mentioned that impact fees could ultimately
result in an increase in rents. For many people, especially those individuals or families just able to afford shelter at existing rents, any
increase at all will have significant consequences. Rising rents can
lead to doubling up of households and a reduction in the number of
new household formations. Larger and fewer households result because
young people delay the time they otherwise would have left their

29. Stegman, Development Fees for Infrastructure, URB. LAND, May 1986, at 2, 4.
30. Noteworthy is that in all scenarios potential buyers have a quantity decision available
to them in addition to a tenure (i.e. buy versus rent) decision. Limited by local zoning and
building codes and the extent of builders' response, homebuyers can address the affordability
issue in a way that still allows them to own a new home.
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parents' home to begin life on their own. Fewer households translates
into fewer housing units, so that in addition to price effects, impact
fees result in a reduction in the effective demand for housing units
and possibly in crowded living conditions.
Florida's growth situation and population demographics lead one to
believe that housing demand among different housing markets is relatively inelastic. If, instead, demand is relatively elastic the analysis
would indicate that any price increase would cause buyers to purchase
desired housing in other markets. The assumption of elastic demand
coupled with limited quantities of developable land and competition in
the residential construction industry (builders cannot adjust their factor costs downward) will force builders in the impact fee community
to accept lower profits or go out of business. In this situation builders
have nowhere to pass the cost of impact fees. As a result the supply
of new housing will be reduced in accordance with the higher costs
that cannot be capitalized into higher prices. Conversely, if the supply
of land in community NF is unlimited, builders would be able to obtain
land at lower costs and, therefore, pass some, or all, of the cost of
an impact fee back to landowners. To the extent that demand is satisfied in community NF and impact fees are capitalized into lower land
values, housing prices will remain unchanged.
Impact fees and other regulations in both community F and NF
may serve to create an element of market power for existing builders
by raising the up-front costs of new homes. Higher initial costs make
it more difficult for new builders to gain access to a market. If builder
entry to a market is restricted, thus reducing competition, and all
other variables are held constant, the price of new housing will be
expected to rise by an amount equal to the cost of the impact fees.
This result, of course, assumes demand is perfectly inelastic. As upfront costs rise so will the level of housing price below which it is no
longer profitable to build. Existing builders who face little, if any,
additional price competition from new entrants to the market can be
expected to increase the size of housing constructed in order to maintain pre-impact fee profit levels.
In community NF market power may exist because of some cost
advantage enjoyed by existing builders rather than higher up-front
costs. For example, existing builders may have large inventories of
land while new builders must bid aggressively in order to obtain
needed land. Or, existing builders may have access to lower-priced
labor or supplies than a new builder. Whatever the reason, new builders find they have higher costs per unit than established builders.
One commentator has described the result if this discrepancy in factor
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costs continued31 New builders eventually will be forced out of the
market, if not precluded from entering altogether. In the long run,
builders will gravitate to different segments of the housing market
where, based on their respective capabilities, their profit potential is
the greatest. The eventual result will be fewer large homes constructed
with different builders serving different market segments.
IV.

CONCLUSIONS

This paper demonstrates that the economic incidence, or burden,
of impact fees will be determined based on the pattern of supply and
demand in a particular housing market. In addition, market structure
affects the degree of competition in the local building industry. The
degree of competition will affect the extent to which impact fees are
capitalized into prices over the short and long run. Legislators, local
government officials, planners, and others considering the use of impact fees to finance the costs associated with growth need to be aware
that impact fees having limited effects in one city or county may have
serious consequences in others. Before any jurisdiction enacts an impact fee ordinance as a means of financing future growth, it should
conduct a careful analysis of the potential negative consequences on
housing affordability that could result. The social costs associated with
a reduced supply of affordable housing may be greater than the savings
accruing to the local capital services budget from impact fee collections.
Further, in certain situations, windfall profits may accrue to homeowners through the increased market value of their properties which result
indirectly from the imposition of impact fees. In these instances, the
impact fee acts to redistribute wealth to unintended beneficiaries.

31. Landis, Land Regulation and the Price of New Housing: Lessons from Three California
Cities, 52 J. Am. PLAN. A. 9 (1986).

